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The institution of contract remedies is the kernel and the most complicated issue of 
contract law. Economic analysis of contract remedies is always one of the hotest 
issues in the law and economics studies. The existing law and economics literature 
attempts to identify the optimal contract remedy through analyzing the effects of 
various remedies on the contract parties' breach behavior, reliance investments and 
precaution investments. Based on a thoroughly review of existing literature, this 
dissertation further studies the effects of the doctrine of anticipatory breach of 
contract and the institution of exceptio non adimpleti contractus, which are the other 
two basic institution in contract law, on the behavioral incentives of contract remedies. 
This study is of great theorical significance for economic study of contract law. 
The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract and the institution of exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus are introduced into contract law of China until 1999, and the 
concrete clauses of these two institutions are very rough and hard to be applied in 
civil procedure. An economic analysis of them would be of great significance in 
promoting the improvment of contract law of China, too. 
This dissertation includes six chapters. Chapter one discusses the studying 
background and the significance of the topic, and defines the studying scope. Chapter 
two reviews the related literatures. Chapter three establishes a basic economic model 
of contract remedies, focusing on the effects of various contract remedies on the 
parties' breach, reliance and precaution decisions. Chapter four extends the former 
analysis to the case of anticipatory breach of contract and compares two different 
doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract. Chapter five studies the behavioral effects 
of the institution of exceptio non adimpleti contractus in bilateral contracts. Chapter 
six is a conclusion. 
There are two main conclusions of this dissertation: 
First, this dissertation extends the behavioral effect analysis of contract remedies 
into the situation of anticipatory breach of contract and compares two different 














of anticipatory breach of contract increases the level of the promisor's breach of 
contract, while it decreases the promisee's reliance investments. Compared to English 
rule, the promisor breaches the contract more and the promisee's reliance investments 
decreseas more under American rule. 
Second, the institution of exceptio non adimpleti contractus distorts the behavioral 
incentives of the contract parties too.Under the routine remedy for breach of contract, 
the introdution of exceptio non adimpleti contractus decreases the level of the parties' 
breach and their incentives to invest in reliance both. 
 
 
Keywords: Contract Remedies; Anticipatory Breach of Contract; Exceptio non 














目  录 
第一章  导论 ............................................................................................1 
第一节  写作背景和意义........................................................................................1 
第二节  研究范围界定 ...........................................................................................3 
第三节  论文结构和研究方法 ................................................................................7 
第二章 文献综述 ....................................................................................10 
第一节 最优法定违约责任形式研究 ....................................................................10 
第二节 违约责任形式的交易成本分析 ................................................................15 
第三节 小结...........................................................................................................20 
第三章 合同违约责任的基本经济模型 .................................................21 
第一节 不完备合同与违约责任制度 ....................................................................21 
第二节 违约责任形式与有效违约 ........................................................................26 
第三节 违约责任形式与有效信赖 ........................................................................36 
第四节 违约责任形式与有效预防 ........................................................................48 
第四章 期前违约制度的经济分析 .........................................................53 
第一节 期前违约的概念........................................................................................53 
第二节 期前违约制度的历史和比较 ....................................................................54 
第三节 期前违约规则中的减轻损失义务.............................................................59 
第四节 期前违约制度的经济分析 ........................................................................62 
第五章 同时履行抗辩权制度的经济分析 .............................................70 
第一节 同时履行抗辩权的法律基础 ....................................................................70 
第二节 同时履行抗辩权的行为效应分析.............................................................77 
第三节 小结...........................................................................................................86 

















Chapter 1  Introduction.........................................................................1 
Section 1  Studying Background and Significance of the Topic ......................... 1 
Section 2  The Definition of Studying Scope ....................................................... 3 
Section 3  Content Arrangement and Main Methods......................................... 7 
Chapter 2  Literature Review..............................................................10 
Section 1  The Study of Optimal Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract ...... 10 
Section 2  The Transaction Cost Analysis of Contract Remedies..................... 15 
Section 3  A Brief Conclusion ............................................................................ 20 
Chapter 3  Basic Economic Model of Contract Remedies .................21 
Section 1  Incomplete Contracts and Contract Remedies ................................ 21 
Section 2  Contract Remedies and Efficient Breach......................................... 26 
Section 3  Contract Remedies and Efficient Reliance ...................................... 36 
Section 4  Contract Remedies and Efficient Precaution................................... 48 
Chapter 4  An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Anticipatory 
Breach of Contract............................................................53 
Section 1  The Definition of Anticipatory Breach of Contract ......................... 53 
Section 2  The History and Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Anticipatory 
Breach of Contract ............................................................................. 54 
Section 3  The Mitigation Principle in the Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach of 
Contract ............................................................................................ 59 
Section 4  An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach of 
Contract ............................................................................................ 62 
Chapter 5  An Economic Analysis of the Institution of Exceptio non 
Adimpleti Contractus .........................................................70 
Section 1  The Legal Foundation of Exceptio non Adimpleti Contractus.......... 70 














Section 3  A Brief Conclusion ............................................................................ 86 



























第一章  导论 
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第一章  导论 
第一节  写作背景和意义 
违约责任，是指合同当事人不履行合同义务或者履行合同义务不符合约定
时，依法产生的民事法律责任（崔建远，2003）。它在英美法系中一般被称为违





















                                                        
① 从违约责任和违约救济的内涵和法律规定来看，二者大体相同。本文统一使用“违约责任”这个术语。
对二者之间存在的细微差别，可参见王利明，《违约责任论》，中国人民大学出版社 2003年版，第 31-34页；

























































第一章  导论 
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善我国合同法上的相关规定提供理论支持。 


























② 对定金的经济效率的一个很好的经济分析，见 Edlin（1996）。 
③ 在某种程度上，采取补救措施也可以被认为是特定履行的一种特殊方式。 


























必须另外投入 r，因此，买方从履行合同中获得的净收益为 v r p− − 。现在假设
卖方违约，没有交付该物品给买方。在预期损害赔偿下，卖方需要支付一笔金钱
使得买方获得与履行合同一样的净收益：v r p− − 。如果买方已经支出了 p和 r，
则预期损害赔偿为 v。在信赖损害赔偿下，卖方需要支付金钱使买方回到订立合









                                                        
① 由于买方错过订立其他合同的机会而造成的损失称为机会成本损失，Cooter and Eisenberg（1985）分析
了它与信赖支出和预期利益的区别。一般来说，机会成本损失介于信赖支出和预期利益之间。一个更全面
的分析，参见 Cooter and Ulen（2003）。 
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① 有学者进一步认为，我国学理上将违约行为所造成的损失同时进行以下两种分类，即实际损失和可 
得利益损失、信赖利益损失和预期利益是不必要的，甚至还会误导司法实践。参见王利明：《违约责任论》





④ Calabresi and Melamed（1972）最早在对财产法的分析中区分了财产规则和责任规则，对它们的进一步分
析，参见 Polinsky（1980）、Craswell（1993）、Krier and Schwab（1995）、Ayres and Talley（1995a，1995b）、
Ayre and Balkin（1996）、Kaplow and Shavell（1995，1996)、Epstein（1997）、Rose（1997）、Bebchuk（2001）
和 Ayres and Goldbart（2003）等等。对这两种规则在合同违约责任的经济分析中的应用，参见 Kronman
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